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The thesis of this essay can be stated as follows: Shareholder-employees should be able to recover for loss of
employment, within the cause of action provided by corporate law, where the termination violates public law,
breaches the agreement among the shareholders, or is unsupported by legitimate business purposes. In Part II,
this essay presents the employment model, including the paradigm of employment that the law builds on, the
starting premise of employment law, the roles of private and public law, and the remedies afforded for
violations of an employee's rights. In Part III, this essay develops the corporate model, discussing much the
same topics and focusing on the ways in which the courts have analyzed freeze-outs of shareholders through
termination of employment. Parts II and III highlight Minnesota law, although the issues and solutions
discussed are generic across American jurisdictions. In Part IV, this essay discusses the interaction of
employment and corporate law. Under Minnesota's “innovative” statute, when a shareholder suffers a loss of
her capacity to contribute her labor to the enterprise, this interest should not be obscured by the capital
interest, but rather protected by the rules of employment law and valued for its own sake.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
If you represented Jane Allison in the following situation, 
how would you categorize her claim? 
Ms. Allison, currently in her early fifties, has worked in 
human resources (HR) for three decades. She spent most of her 
t Professor, William Mitchell COllege of Law. Thanks go to Thomas J. Newby, 
William Mitchell class of January 1997, for his able research assistance, and to Dean 
Harry J. Haynsworth and Prof. Daniel S. Kieinberger, for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this essay. 
1435 
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career working on the HR staff of various local corporations; her 
specialty has been training employees and managers on issues of 
diversity and workplace relations. About five years ago, when her 
youngest daughter left for college, Ms. Allison began to think 
about making changes in various aspects of her life, including 
her career. She desired more control over her schedule, and 
she wanted to indulge her desire to be her own boss. So Ms. 
Allison responded positively to an overture from three junior 
colleagues to form an HR consulting firm that would provide 
training on issues of diversity and workplace relations. The 
colleagues sought out Ms. Allison for the credibility and contacts 
her lengthy career afforded her. 
Ms. Allison and her three colleagues agreed that each would 
contribute one-quarter of the firm's start-up capital, serve as an 
officer (Ms. Allison as vice-president) and director, and provide 
consulting services for the firm's clients. The foursome incorpo-
rated the firm, creating a closely held corporation. 
Initially the firm operated without written agreements as to 
the rights of the founders in the event of separation. Ms. Allison 
intended to stay with the firm until retirement. Two years ago, 
the founders executed separation agreements, which provide 
that a shareholder may be terminated from employment on the 
basis of "performance deficiencies." 
Although the business operated smoothly and successfully 
for four years, relationships between Ms. Allison and the other 
founders deteriorated rapidly over the past year. In part, the 
others wished to expand the business rapidly, particularly 
through the use of contract trainers; Ms. Allison believed that 
the firm could not supervise the contract trainers adequately and 
that the firm's reputation for quality would suffer from too rapid 
growth. In part, the other founders perceived that Ms. Allison 
had become less productive. They perceived that she worked 
fewer hours than when the business started; that her presenta-
tions were less dynamic and effective; and that their customers 
sought a livelier, more current training program. These 
impressions were based on slim anecdotal evidence. The other 
founders also determined that the firm was well enough 
established that Ms. Allison's contacts and credibility were of 
little present utility. 
While Ms. Allison was, of course, aware of the strain, she was 
nonetheless surprised when the other founders voted to reduce 
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her salary and deny her a quarterly bonus. This action precipi-
tated a meeting at which the other founders bluntly detailed 
their dissatisfaction with her. The firm's president summarized 
the concerns as follows: "Perhaps it's your age-who knows? The 
point is that you are out of step with current training trends and 
the needs of our customers. And you are keeping this firm from 
realizing its growth potential." The meeting ended acrimonious-
ly. Two weeks later, Ms. Allison was informed that her employ-
ment was terminated. She was given a check as payment for her 
shares, which she considers seriously below fair market value. 
Ms. Allison's case is difficult to categorize because it arises 
out of a complex relationship among Ms. Allison, her co-
founders, and the firm. Just as property ownership can be 
understood as a "bundle of sticks," so Ms. Allison can be 
understood as holding a "bundle of sticks" relative to the firm. 
The "sticks" are relationships: founder, shareholder, director, 
officer, employee. l These relationships are governed in various 
ways by public law and private law, i.e., contract. Viewed one 
way, Ms. Allison is a fired employee, and her case is an employ-
ment case. Viewed another way, she is a frozen-out minority 
shareholder, and her case is a closely held corporation case.2 
In Part II, this essay presents the employment model, 
including the paradigm of employment that the law builds on, 
1. In many cases, there is yet another relationship: that of family member. See, 
e.g., Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (brothers), petitiunforrroiew 
denied (Minn. Oq. 20, 1992); Dullea v. Dullea Co., No. C8-91-498, 1991 WL 271479, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1991) (fathers and sons), petitiun for reuiew denied., (Minn. 
Feb. 19, 1992) . Regrettably, the courts seem to consider family ties insignificant in the 
analysis of the equities of these cases. 
2. The contrast in imagery here is interesting: Why are employees "fired" while 
shareholders are "frozen out"? Of course, neither is a particularly appealing prospect. 
3. As an essay, this paper has less extensive references than a standard article. For 
additional guidance on the corporate law topics discussed here, see F. HODGE O'NEAL 
& ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995) 
[hereinafter O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS]; F. HODGE O'NEAL & 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1985) 
[hereinafter O'NEAL & THOMPSON, OPPRESSION]; Daniel S. K1einberger, Why Not Good 
Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corpurations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 
1143 (1990) (commenting primarily on Minnesota law); Joseph E. Olson, A Statutory 
Elixir for the Oppressiun Malady, 36 MERCER L. REv. 627 (1985) (primarily on Minnesota 
law). For additional guidance on the employment law topics discussed here, see 
WILLIAM]. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL]' LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES (2d ed. 1993); ABIGAIL C. MOD JESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw (3d 
ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995); STEPHEN F. BEFORT & KAREN G. SCHANFIELD, MINNESOTA 
PRACTICE: EMPLOYMENT LAw AND PRACTICE (1995) (discussing primarily Minnesota law). 
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the starting premise of employment law, the roles of private and 
public law, and the remedies afforded for violations of an 
employee's rights. In Part III, this essay develops the corporate 
model, discussing much the same topics and focusing on the 
ways in which the courts have analyzed freeze-outs of sharehold-
ers through termination of employment. Parts II and III 
highlight Minnesota law, although the issues and solutions 
discussed are generic across American jurisdictions. In Part IV, 
this essay discusses the interaction of employment and corporate 
law. The thesis of this essay can be stated as follows: Sharehold-
er-employees should be able to recover for loss of employment, 
within the cause of action provided by corporate law, where the 
termination violates public law, breaches the agreement among 
the shareholders, or is unsupported by legitimate business 
purposes. 
II. THE EMPLOYMENT MODEL 
A. The Paradigm 
The paradigm of employment, on which employment law 
rests, is a distinct, hierarchical dyad. The employer is a distinctly 
separate entity from and superior to the employee. The 
employer "rents" the employee. That is, the employee provides 
labor, effort, creativity, loyalty, etc. In return, the employer 
provides compensation as well as certain working conditions. 
Compensation typically takes the form of money (salary, hourly 
wages, bonuses) and benefits (insurance, pension, paid vacation). 
Working conditions include the physical environment, work 
schedule, performance standards, and organizational structure.4 
A key condition of employment isjob security (or insecuri-
ty). Losing one's job is difficult because, with time, employees 
become bound to employers.5 Seniority systems tie compensa-
tion and favorable working conditions to tenure with the 
employer. Employees develop job skills of little use to other 
employers. Employees become psychologically committed to the 
employer and co-workers; they come to define themselves by 
4. See generally JOHN M. IVANCEVlCH, HUMAN REsOURCE MANAGEMENT: FOUNDA-
TIONS OF PERSONNEL (5th ed. 1992). 
5. See Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the 
Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REv. 457 (1979). 
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their career identity.6 Work provides structure and meaning to 
daily life.7 
Evidence suggests that the employer benefits from the 
provision of job security as well. A policy of job security induces 
the employee to feel obligated to reciprocate, that is, to work 
loyally and to stay with the employer.s Job insecurity correlates 
with reduced work effort, propensity to leave the employer, and 
resistance to change within the workplace.9 Of course, an 
employer providing job security thereby reduces its flexibility 
somewhat. 
To a certain extent, the employer and the employee 
negotiate the terms of their relationship, such as the degree of 
job security. According to the theory of compensating differen-
tials, employees "buy" advantageous working conditions by 
accepting reduced compensation.10 Thus, for example, a highly 
secure position may be paid less than a comparable position with 
little job security.ll 
To an ever increasing extent, the law also determines the 
terms of the employment relationship. 
B. The operating Premise: Employment at Will 
Despite the significance of job security to employees and 
employers, the operating premise of employment law is the rule 
of at-will employment: that the employer or employee may 
terminate the relationship for any or no reason. 12 
6. See REpORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO SECRETARY OF HEALTH. EDUCATION 
AND WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 3-7 (1973). 
7. When asked to name the most important things in life, Sigmund Freud 
reportedly answered, "All that matters is love and work. n THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
QUOTATIONS 294, No.2 (4th ed. 1992). 
8. Denise M. Rousseau, New Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their Employer's 
Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts, 11 J. ORG'L BEHAV. 389 (1990). 
9. See Leonard Greenhalgh & Zehave Rosenblatt, Job Insecurity: Toward Conceptual 
Clarity, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 438 (1984); Leonard Greenhalgh, Managing the Job Insecurity 
Crisis, 22 HUM. REsOURCES MGMT. 431 (1984). 
10. See Mahmood Arai, Compensating Wage Differentials Versus Efficiency Wages: An 
Empirical Study of Job Autonomy and Wages, 33 INDUS. REL. 249 (1994); W. Kip Viscusi & 
Michael J. Moore, Warner Learning and Compensating Differentials, 45 INDUS. & LABOR REL. 
REv. 80 (1991-92). 
11. See Catherine Schwoerer & Benson Rosen, Effects ofEmployment-at-WiUPolicies on 
Corporate Image and Job Pursuit Intentions, 74J. APPLIED PSVCHOL. 653 (1989). 
12. E.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983); 
Payne v. Western & AtI. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). At one time, the U.S. 
Supreme Court saw a constitutional dimension to the at-will rule. Adair v. United 
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The at-will rule has been the subject of some praise and 
considerable criticism in recent years. The primary argument in 
support of the at-will rule is one of economic efficiency: the 
employer and employee choose at-will through autonomous 
contracting; it provides both with a measure for controlling the 
other's behavior (the employer can terminate the employee, and 
the employee can quit); it permits either to sever a bad relation-
ship easily; and it produces little transaction costs (e.g., litiga-
tion) .13 Critics assert, however, that at-will employment permits 
employers to coerce employees into illegal or illicit acts;I4 
employees do not stand on an equal footing with employers and 
are dependent on job security;I5 and countries similar to the 
United States mandate job security.I6 
Presumably in response to this criticism, numerous excep-
tions to the at-will rule have developed in recent yearsP Some 
rest on private law, that is, the parties' own contract; others 
derive from public law, that is, statutory or tort rules applicable 
regardless of the parties' contract. 
C. Private Law Exceptions to Employment at Will 
Employment at will is a default rule-it operates only in the 
absence of a contract to the contrary. IS In recent years, courts 
have recognized such contracts in a variety of situations. I9 The 
States, 208 U.S. 161, 173-76 (1908). 
13. E.g., Richard A Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, in LABOR LAw AND THE 
EMPLOYMENT MARKET: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 3 (Richard A Epstein &Jeffrey 
Paul eds., 1985). 
14. E.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Emplnyment at WiU vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
the Abusive Exercise of Emplnyer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1407-08 (1967). 
15. E.g.,j. Peter Shapiro &James F. Tune, Implied Contract Rights toJob Security, 26 
STAN. L. REv. 335, 337-40 (1974). 
16. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time 
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 508-19 (1976) (citing France, Germany, Great Britain, 
and Sweden). 
17. The first dramatic incursion into employment at will came in 1935 with the 
enactment of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). National Labor Relations Act, 
ch. 372, 49 Stat. 452 (1935). The NLRA prohibits discharge based on union activities, 
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994), and has led to a legal regime highly supportive of collective 
bargaining agreements requiring just cause and arbitration. See United Paperworkers 
Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
18. As the Minnesota Supreme Court has described it, the at-will rule is a rule of 
"contract construction," not substantive law. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 
N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983). 
19. See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 3, at 133-264. 
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following examples from leading Minnesota cases are typical. 
In Thomsen v. Independent School District No. 91, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that a written employment contract for a 
fixed term is enforceable.2o Further, the court held that an 
employment contract for a fixed term is terminable only for 
causeY 
In the leading Minnesota case on contracts for job security, 
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
determined that an employee handbook containing specific 
dismissal procedures was effective as a contract, where the 
language was definite, the handbook had been disseminated to 
the terminated employee, and the employee had continued to 
work thereafter.22 Less definite language regarding grounds for 
termination was not deemed contractually binding, however.23 
Furthermore, as later cases have established, disclaimers can 
preserve the at-will rule. Examples include language preserving 
the employer's prerogative or indicating that no contract is 
intended.24 
Given certain supporting facts, oral promises of job security 
may be deemed to constitute contracts. In Eklund v. Vincent Brass 
& Aluminum Co., the Minnesota Court of Appeals permitted the 
jury to decide a case based on an oral offer of employment until 
retirement, so long as the employee performed satisfactorily, 
where the employer was informed that the employee was giving 
up a long-term position elsewhere and that the employee and his 
family would be making mcyor changes in their lives based on 
the promise.25 Employers, however, generally win cases with 
less compelling facts to corroborate the oral promise.26 
20. Thomsen v. IndependentSch. Dist. No. 91, 244 N.W.2d 282.284 (Minn. 1976). 
21. Id. 
22. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 630. 
23. Id.; see also Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 
1986) (finding language definite enough even though precise nature of rights was 
unclear); Hunt v. mM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 856-57 
(Minn. 1986) (finding handbook language too vague to go to thejury). 
24. See, e.g., Audette v. Northeast State Bank, 436 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (urging "bold print or other emphasis" in the placement of the disclaimer); 
Simonson v. Meader Distrib'n Co., 413 N.W.2d 146, 14748 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating that language in a handbook may reserve employer discretion). 
25. Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 375-76 (Minn. Ct. 
App.1984). 
26. E.g., Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 1995) 
(holding promises made to employee not sufficiently definite to create offer of 
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When the employee provides an unusual contribution to the 
employer, beyond the labor required by the job itself, the court 
may recognize an enforceable contract even though the parties' 
communications are inadequate to form an enforceable contract. 
In Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, Inc., the court reversed 
summary judgment for the employer where the employee 
donated $350,000 in stock to the college in exchange for 
permanent employment, finding that the stock constituted 
valuable consideration sufficient to overcome the at-will ruleY 
The courts have recognized the parties' power to alter their 
arrangement as to job security over time. The Pine River case, 
for example, involved an initially at-will employee who acquired 
job security when the employer promulgated the employee 
handbook.28 In a more recent case, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court affirmed that an employer can shift from a contract 
providing job security to an at-will arrangement so long as the 
new document clearly rescinds the previous document.29 
The courts also have adjudicated cases in which employers 
have sent two concurrent and conflicting messages. For 
example, in Bratton v. Menard, Inc., the employer's handbook 
provided for progressive discipline, while the individual contract 
indicated that the employment was at-will; the court sent the case 
to the j ury. 30 Similarly the court reversed summary judgment 
for the employer in Rognlien v. Carter, where the handbook con-
tained an at-will statement, but oral statements indicated that the 
position carried job security.31 
Where the traditional requirements of contract are not met, 
but the equities of the situation are compelling, a promissory 
estoppel claim may succeed. In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Mr. 
Grouse succeeded on this theory, where he quit his previous job 
and turned down another job offer in reliance on Group 
Health's offer, only to learn that Group Health had given the job 
to another candidate even before Mr. Grouse could start 
employment); Aberman v. Malden Mills Indus., 414 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987) (holding subjective impression insufficient). 
27. Bussard v. College of Saint Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 228, 200 N.W.2d 155, 
161 (1972). 
28. Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 626-27. 
29. Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 708 (Minn. 1992). 
30. Bratton v. Menard, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 116, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
31. Rognlien v. Carter, 443 N.W.2d 217,219-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
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work. 32 However, the courts have subsequently limited the 
application of promissory estoppel in various respects.33 
D. Public Law Exceptions to Employment at Will 
Even where the parties have not themselves contracted away 
from the at-will rule, the law restricts the employer's prerogative. 
In broad terms, these restrictions express the public's interest by 
prohibiting conduct that either harms society as a whole or 
crosses the boundaries of acceptable behavior within our culture. 
Some restrictions operate through legislation, others through the 
application of standard tort law principles to the employment 
setting.34 
Federal and state statutes prohibit discrimination in 
employment based on certain protected statuses of the employ-
ee.35 At the federal level, Title VII prohibits discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin;36 the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) protects 
employees forty and over;37 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) protects disabled employees.38 Paralleling and 
extending the federal statutes, the Minnesota Human Rights Act 
(MHRA) prohibits discrimination based on race, color, creed, 
national origin, religion, sex, marital status, status with regard to 
public assistance, membership or activity in a local commission 
dealing with discrimination, disability, age, and sexual orienta-
tion.39 As legislative history makes clear, these statutes are 
intended not just to protect individual employees against 
discrimination, but also to avoid the economic and human waste 
32. Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981). 
33. Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 1995) (applying 
"clear and definite" standard); Spanier v. TCF Bank Sav., 495 N.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1993) (cutting off promissory estoppel claim where the employee had worked 
for the employer for one year). 
34. See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 3, at 199-243, 276-363; MOD JESKA, supra 
note 3, at 194-306; BEFORT & SCHANFIELD, supra note 3, at 192-209, 334-55. 
35. Indeed, local ordinances paralleling the federal and state legislation also may 
be pertinent. E.g., ST. PAUL, MINN., CODE §§ 183.01-.03 (1993); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 139.10-.40 (1993). 
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (regarding race 
discrimination) . 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). 
39. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 2(2) (1994); see also MINN. STAT. § 181.81 (1994) 
(regarding age). 
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of employment discrimination based on irrelevant characteris-
tics. 40 
A second set of statutes prohibits employers from terminat-
ing employees for actions that may further the public interest. 
By Minnesota statute, employers may not terminate employees 
who report in good faith actual or suspected violations of the law 
to government officials, who are requested to participate in a 
public hearing or investigation, who refuse to perform an act 
reasonably believed to violate the law,41 or who serve on ju-
ries.42 Various state and federal statutes protect employees who 
further particular statutory aims such as environmental protec-
tion.43 
A third set of statutes also protects employees against 
reprisal, not for engaging in an action of direct public benefit, 
but rather for asserting the employee's own legal rights. The 
premise of these statutes is that rights guaranteed employees 
would be hollow if employers could terminate employees who 
assert statutory rights. As examples, statutes on the following 
topics include non-reprisal provisions: non-discrimination,44 
union activities,45 minimum wage and overtime,46 pensions 
and benefits,47 family and medical leaves,48 and safety and 
health.49 Somewhat related are statutes protecting employees' 
privacy interests from undue intrusion.5o 
40. E.g., H.R REp. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2401 (1964) (Additional Views), 
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.CAN. 2513-17; H.R REp. No. 101-485, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 25-
26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 147-49. 
41. As to the third situation, the employee must inform the employer that the 
order is being resisted on that ground. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (1994); see also Phipps 
v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) (seeming to create a 
parallel common law cause of action); Bolton v. Department of Human Serv., 527 
N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (indicating that the statute occupies the field), 
rev'd on other grounds, 540 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1995). 
42. MINN. STAT. § 593.50 (1994). 
43. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-28 (1994); 40 C.F.R § 80.1-.26 (1995). 
_ 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (Tide VII); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1992) (ADEA); 
42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (1994) (ADA); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 7 (1994) (MHRA). 
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(I), (3) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 179.12 (1994). 
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 177.32, subd. 2 (1994). 
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-41 (1994). 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1994); MINN. STAT. § 181.941, subd. 3 (1994). 
49. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 176.82, 182.669 (1994 & Supp. 
1995). 
50. Federal law and state law regulate polygraph testing. See 29 U.S.C. § 2002 
(1994); MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1994). State law also regulates drug and alcohol testing; 
MINN. STAT. § 181.950, and consumption of lawful substances; MINN. STAT. §§ 181.938 
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Tort law, in defining the boundaries of acceptable behavior 
within our culture, regulates not so much the reason for, but the 
manner of terminating employees. Defamation law provides a 
recovery for an employee who has been slandered or libeled in 
situations where the employer has acted improperly enough to 
lose the benefit of the qualified privilege typically afforded such 
speech.51 In rare cases, an employer may be liable for fraud or 
misrepresentation in a termination situation.52 Even less likely, 
but theoretically possible, is the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 53 If a manager acts outside the scope of his 
or her employment and in doing so tortiously interferes with an 
employee's employment contract, there may be personal tort 
liability.54 
Thus far, Minnesota courts have declined to adopt the 
position of a minority of American jurisdictions: That employers 
are bound by law to a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
much as other contracts carry such an obligation.55 Rather, the 
facts of the specific situation must give rise to the covenant for 
such a potentially broad protection of job security to apply.56 
(1994). On the topic of economic privacy, federal and state law address garnishment 
of wages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1994); MINN. STAT. § 571.61 (1994). 
51. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980) 
(general framework); see also MINN. STAT. § 181.933 (1994) (requiring the employer to 
give the employee a truthful statement of the reason for termination and providing 
some immunity against defamation); Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 
144 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing intracorporate defamation); Lewis v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing compelled self-
publication); Bolton v. Department of Human Services, 540 N.W.2d 523, 525-26 (Minn. 
1995) (declining to recognize defamation by conduct); Wirigv. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 
N.W.2d 374, 380-81 (Minn. 1990) (loss of qualified privilege). 
52. E.g., Hanks v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 302,308-10 (Minn. Ct. 
App.1992). 
53. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437 (Minn. 1983). 
Negligent infliction of emotional distress may be available as an add-on to other torts. 
Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
54. See Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505-06 (Minn. 
1991). 
55. Compare Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1988) (broad 
implication of good faith obligation) with Fonune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 
N.E.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Mass. 1977) (narrower rule). 
56. Compare Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 503 (opining that it is unclear whether 
Minnesota recognizes such a clause) and Hunt v. IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit 
Union, 384 N.W.2d 853,858 (Minn. 1986) (finding that language in handbook crez.ted 
question offact) with Bratton v. Menard, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 116, 118-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (language in handbook created question of fact). See generally Deborah A 
Schmedemann, Warning Backwards: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in 
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E. Remedies 
The remedies afforded a successful plaintiff in a wrongful 
discharge case depend on the theory supporting recovery. 
For breach of contract claims, the remedy is damages, 
measured by what the employee would have received had the 
contract been carried out according to its terms.57 While the 
typical award is back-pay, front-pay (i.e., a pay-based remedy 
extending beyond the date of trial) also may be awarded in an 
appropriate case.58 The employee has the duty to mitigate.59 
An alternative contract measure when the contract is not well 
defined is quantum meruit.60 Recovery based on promissory 
estoppel is confined to the plaintiff's reliance damages, rather 
than what he or she would have earned from the defendant 
employer.61 
Tort remedies are more substantial than contract remedies. 
The successful plaintiff in a tort case may recover compensatory, 
emotional distress, and punitive damages.62 The latter requires 
proof of willful indifference to the plaintiff's rights.63 
Two important remedies are unlikely to be afforded for 
contract or tort claims: reinstatement and attorney's fees. The 
latter may be recoverable where the contract provides for it,64 
which is unlikely in employment cases, or where the employer or 
its attorney has conducted the litigation in bad faith.65 
The remedy available to the successful plaintiff in a statutory 
case is set by the specific statute. The possibilities include not 
only those listed above, but also liquidated damages, attorney's 
fees, and equitable or affirmative relief, namely reinstatement to 
employment. For example, the federal Age Discrimination in 
Empluyment Law, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1119 (1990) (discussing the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing in Minnesota). 
57. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622,632 (Minn. 1983). 
58. Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Minn. 1992). 
59. [d. at 709. 
60. Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn. 1986). 
61. Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981). 
62. E.g., Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 1983); 
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259-60 (Minn. 1980). 
63. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1994). 
64. University of Minnesota v. Goodkind, 399 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987), reu'd on other grounds, 417 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 1988). 
65. MINN. STAT. § 549.21 (1994). 
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Employment Act provides for back-pay, attorney's fees, liquidated 
damages (double the actual damages) in the event of willful 
misconduct, and reinstatement.66 By comparison, the Minneso-
ta Human Rights Act provides for back-pay and benefits, 
compensatory damages up to three times the actual damages 
sustained, damages for mental anguish and suffering, up to 
$8,500 in punitive damages, a civil penalty, and attorney's fees, 
as well as reinstatement.67 
III. THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION MODEL 
A. The Paradigm 
By Minnesota statute, a closely held corporation is a 
corporation which does not have more than thirty-five sharehold-
ers.68 The paradigm of the closely held corporation is a flat, 
blurry organization, an "intimate enterprise. "69 Investment, 
control, administration, and labor (at least in part) are in the 
hands of a small number of individuals. This is unlike large, 
publicly held corporations where these functions are allocated to 
different individuals or groupS.70 
As alluded to in Part I, the shareholder in a closely held 
corporation typically holds a "bundle" of relationships with the 
corporation. The shareholder not only invests in and partially 
owns the corporation, but also may have founded it and most 
likely directs it, manages it, and labors on its behalf.71 Further-
more, these relationships with the corporate entity probably are 
secondary, in terms of everyday significance, to the shareholder's 
relationship with the other shareholders. The shareholders in 
a closely held corporation are engaged in a mutual venture 
involving the financial resources, energy, time, creativity, 
commitment, loyalty, reputation, and livelihood of each share-
holder.72 Unlike the standard employment relationship, where 
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 216, 217 (1994). 
67. MINN. STAT. § 363.071, subd. 2 (1994). 
68. MINN. STAT. § 302A.Oll, subd. 6a (1994). 
69. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for oppression, 48 Bus. 
LAw. 699, 702 (1993). 
70. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, § 1:08. 
71. [d. § 1:07. Of course, some shareholders do not work for their corporations. 
This essay focuses on shareholders who do. 
72. [d. (explaining business situations that give rise to the formation of close 
corporations); see also Thompson, supra note 70, at 702. 
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the employer is a discernible entity distinct from the employee, 
a shareholder in a closely held corporation is in essence 
employed by himself or herself and his or her co-sharehold-
ers.is 
As in a standard employment relationship, the shareholder's 
exit from a closely held corporation is difficult. Loss of the 
shareholder relationship entails loss of employment, as discussed 
in Part II. In addition, it is difficult for the shareholder to 
extract his or her economic share from the corporation because 
there is no market for the shares.74 Involuntary exit, or "freeze-
out," can be accomplished in various ways: forced redemption of 
shares, transactions benefitting some shareholders over the 
frozen-out shareholder, withholding of dividends, and termina-
tion of employment.75 
The remainder of this part focuses on the law's handling of 
freeze-outs accomplished through termination of employment. 
B. The operating Premise: The Duty to Act Fairly 
Minnesota's Business Corporations Act (MBCA) provides 
remedies for frozen-out minority shareholders of closely held 
corporations. The present statute76 provides remedies when: 
(2) the directors or those in control of the corporation have 
acted fraudulently or illegally toward one or more sharehold-
ers in their capacities as shareholders or directors, or as 
officers or employees of a closely held corporation; 
73. See 1 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, § 1:08. 
74. [d.; see also 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, § 9:02. 
75. See generaUy 2 O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 3, § 9:03. 
76. The statute was first enacted in 1981. Minnesota Business Corporations Act, 
ch. 270, § 108, 1981 Minn. Laws. 1213. As initially enacted, the statute provided a 
remedy when a minority shareholder was treated "fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner 
persistently unfair." The 1983 amendments lowered the threshold for statutory relief 
to "unfairly prejudicial" and introduced the concept that injury suffered as an employee 
qualifies for statutory protection. Ch. 368, § 9, 1983 Minn. Laws 2524. 
For a discussion of the law preceding the statute, see MINN. STAT. § 302A.751 
(1981) (Reporter's Notes). For the leading common law cases pertaining to fiduciary 
duty, see Harris v. Mardan Business Sys., 421 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(determining that an individual with a small percentage of stock and "sweat equity" in 
the corporation must rely on employment law, rather than corporate law, to challenge 
his termination), petition far review denied, (Minn. May 18, 1988); Evans v. Blesi, 345 
N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding for the frozen-out shareholder where the 
majority engaged in various acts of intimidation and secretiveness, under a standard 
requiring open, honest, and fair treatment; awarding lost wages, punitive damages, and 
a buy-out). 
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(3) the directors or those in control of the corporation have 
acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more 
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or directors 
of a corporation that is not a publicly held corporation, or as 
officers or employees of a closely held corporation; .... 77 
1449 
Furthermore, in subdivision 3a, the MBCA contains explicit 
directions to the courts analyzing cases involving closely held 
corporations: 
[T] he court shall take into consideration the duty which all 
shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one another 
to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the 
operation of the corporation and the reasonable expectations 
of all shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop 
during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the 
corporation and each other. For purposes of this section, any 
written agreements, including employment agreements and 
buy-sell agreements, between or among shareholders or 
between or among one or more shareholders and the 
corporation are presumed to reflect the parties' reasonable 
expectations concerning matters dealt with in the agree-
ments.78 
Subdivision 3a was originally enacted in 1983.79 The last 
sentence was added in 1994; at the same time, the legislature 
changed the first sentence's reference to the reasonable expecta-
tions of "the shareholders" to now read "all shareholders."8o 
Distilled to its essentials, the MBCA provides several 
standards applicable to freeze-outs of minority sharehold-
ers-including actions taken against shareholders as employees. 
The general rule proscribes conduct that is "fraudulent," 
"illegal," or "unfairly prejudicial." Subdivision 3a states two 
distinct duties: (l) to act "in an honest, fair, and reasonable 
manner" and (2) to act in accord with the "reasonable expecta-
tions of all shareholders," which are presumptively reflected in 
written agreements. This language has parallels in the statutes 
and case law of other states.81 
77. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(2),(3), subd. 2 (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
78. ld. § 302A. 751, subd. 3a. 
79. Ch. 368, § 11, 1983 Minn. Laws. 2526. 
80. Ch. 417, § 11, 1994 Minn. Laws. 191. 
81. See Thompson, supra note 69, at 708-18 (discussing statutes and cases employing 
the concepts of oppression, unfair prejudice, and reasonable expectations). It is not, 
however, common for a statute to specifically identify the shareholder's employment 
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Insofar as the Minnesota statute sets norms based on the 
shareholders' reasonable expectations, it looks to private law, 
e.g., contract. The remaining language seems to set a public law 
standard.82 As the law has developed, the concepts of unfair 
prejudice and reasonable expectations have merged, while fraud 
and illegality have received less judicial attention. 
C. Unfair Prejudice and Reasonable Expectations 
There are various possible answers to the abstract issue 
whether the employment rights of a shareholder-employee 
should be greater than, the same as, or less than those of an 
employee who is not also a shareholder. One could decide that 
the rights should be the same as those of a regular employee, 
which is to say that the at-will rule would prevail absent an 
exception available to a regular employee.83 One could decide 
that the shareholder qualifies for some measure of job security 
not available to regular employees.84 In several cases imple-
menting the language of section 302A.751, the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals has crafted a more complex, fact-specific, middle-
ground approach. 
In Sawyer v. Curt & Co., a case with few stated facts, the 
court wrote in broad terms of the relationship between reason-
able expectations, unfair prejudice, and the shareholder's 
employment interest.85 Ms. Sawyer and three other individuals 
owned the company in which Ms. Sawyer served as president, 
CEO, and director. She was removed as president and CEO by 
the others for undisclosed reasons.86 The court wrote: 
Unfairly prejudicial conduct may be found if a share-
interest. Id. at 713 n.SS. 
82. See Kleinberger, supra note 3, at 1155 (explaining that the statute creates 
contract and tort-like issues). 
83. For an example of this approach and discussion of its wisdom, see Ingle v. 
Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (N.Y. 1989); AlyseJ. Ferraro, Ingle 
v. Glamure Motor Sales, Inc.: The Battk &tween Ownership and Emplayment in the Clase 
Corporation, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 193, 202 (1990). 
84. For an example of this approach and discussion of it, see Gigax v. Repka, 615 
N.E.2d 644, 647-48 (Ohio 1992); Kathleen L. Kuhlman, Beyond CrosUy v. Beam: Ohio 
Courts Extend Protection of Minority Shareholders of Close Corporation, 27 AKRON L. REv. 477 
(1994). 
85. Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C9-90-2040, C7-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (publication order vacated, 1991 WL 160333, Minn. 
Aug. I, 1991). 
86. Id. at *1. 
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holder's reasonable expectations with respect to that share-
holder's relationship to the corporation are defeated. There 
is no doubt the reasonable expectations of respondent, who 
is a shareholder-employee-founder of appellant corporation, 
included a job, a salary and a significant place in manage-
ment. This expectation was frustrated when she was terminat-
ed from her employment without any attempt to compensate 
her for the loss of status within the corporation. We believe 
when those in control of a closely held corporation terminate 
the employment of a moving shareholder, a good faith effort 
must be made to buy-out the shareholder at a fair price or 
adjust the income distribution mechanism to assure the 
shareholder an equitable investment return.S7 
1451 
Thus, the court afforded Ms. Sawyer a remedy under section 
302A. 75 1.88 
Then in Dullea v. Dullea Co., the court viewed the employ-
ment and corporate claims as unrelated.89 John Dullea brought 
suit when he was fired from the family farming corporation. He 
challenged not only his termination, but also the management 
of the corporation and pension fund.90 In one part of the 
opinion, the court ruled that Mr. Dullea's wrongful termination 
claim failed because he was an at-will employee and had not 
proved any exceptions to the at-will rule.91 In another part of 
the opinion, the court ruled against him on his section 302A.751 
claim, finding that he had participated in making the decisions 
he challenged, legitimate business reasons supported the 
challenged expenditures, and he had received adequate salary 
and benefits.92 It is unclear whether Mr. Dullea's pleadings 
framed his termination as an incident of unfair prejudice under 
section 302A. 751. 
Easily the most prominent of the several appellate cases 
under section 302A.751 is Pedro v. Pedro.93 The three Pedro 
87. Id. at *2 (citations omitted). 
88. Id. at *3. 
89. No. C8-91-498, 1991 WL 271479, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1991), rev. 
denied, (Minn. Feb. 19, 1992). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at *3. 
92. Id. 
93. 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (second decision of this case), petition 
for review denied, (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Pedro II]; Pedro v. Pedro, 463 
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (first decision of this case), petition for review denied, 
(Minn. Jan. 24, 1991) [hereinafter Pedro I]. 
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brothers co-owned and co-managed the family luggage business. 
They had worked in the business for decades when squabbles 
began in the late 1980s. Alfred discovered discrepancies in the 
business' books, and he pressed for an investigation. Although 
his brothers resisted, two accountants did investigate and 
determined that there were indeed missing funds. Alfred's 
brothers harassed him during this period, e.g., by having him 
trailed by a private investigator, by interfering in his areas of 
responsibility, and by threatening to fire him. Ultimately, they 
placed him on a leave of absence and then, at age sixty-two, fired 
him and told employees he had suffered a nervous break-
down.94 
In the first appeal, the court of appeals ruled that the trial 
court had used the jury improperly to decide the case, rather 
than advise the court, and thus remanded.95 The court also 
discussed the general purpose and operation of section 
302A.751. The court first noted that, under the common law, 
shareholders are analogous to partners and thus owe each other 
a fiduciary duty.96 Because minority shareholders are in a 
vulnerable position, section 302A.751 affords the courts broad 
discretion to achieve equity when shareholders are unfairly 
treated.97 As for the employment interest in particular, the 
court found that "[i]n a closely held corporation the nature of 
the employment of a shareholder may create a reasonable 
expectation by the employee-owner that his employment is not 
terminable at Will."98 The court also noted that the proper 
inquiry is whether the shareholder has a reasonable "expecta-
tion" of job security, not whether there was an "agreement" to 
that effect.99 
In the second appeal, the court affirmed a substantial award 
to Alfred Pedro. loo In addition to the principles set forth 
above, the court noted that the law requires shareholders to act 
in accord with the "highest standards of integrity and good faith 
94. Pedro II, 489 N.W.2d at 799-800. 
95. Pedro I, 463 N.W.2d at 288. 
96. Id. (citing Westland Capitol Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, 308 N.W.2d 709,712 (Minn. 
1981); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775,779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984». 
97. Id. at 288-89. 
98. Id. at 289. 
99. Id. at 289-90. Presumably an "expectation" is more easily formed than an 
"agreement. " The issue arose as a challenge to the special verdict form. 
100. Pedro II, 489 N.W.2d at 80()'()1. 
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in their dealings with each other. "101 The court cited various 
actions failing to meet this standard: hiring the private investiga-
tor, fabricating false accusations, failing to make the payments 
required under the stock repurchase agreement, etc.102 More 
important, the court noted that a shareholder's reasonable 
expectation extends beyond ownership to include a job and 
salary, referring to the Pine River and Eklund cases, and then 
concluded that the facts implied an agreement to provide 
lifetime employment to Alfred. The court stressed the longevity 
of the brothers' employment. lOS Thus, the loss of the employ-
ment interest merited separate recovery.104 
Finally, the court of appeals reached a different outcome, 
while essentially following the Pedro analysis, in Kelley v. Rudd.105 
Mr. Kelley and Mr. Rudd co-founded a jewelry business in which 
Mr. Rudd eventually became the majority shareholder. Early on, 
Mr. Kelley formed an expectation of permanent employment, 
but he and Mr. Rudd then entered into two consecutive 
employment agreements providing for termination with notice 
but without cause. After these agreements expired, Mr. Rudd 
terminated Mr. Kelley's employment. 106 
The court denied Mr. Kelley a remedy under section 
302A.751.107 Mr. Kelley's claim hinged on his termination, and 
the court determined that, unlike Alfred Pedro, he did not have 
a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Although 
Mr. Kelley may have had such an expectation before the written 
agreements, they altered that expectation. lOB The court did 
not explain why the original expectation did not revive once the 
agreements expired. Furthermore, the court found that Mr. 
Rudd had not engaged in intimidating tactics. 109 
101. [d. at 801 (citing Prince v. Sonnesyn, 25 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. 1946». 
102. The court rejected the defendants' argument that there could be no recovery 
if the shares had not diminished in value. [d. at 801-02. 
103. The court also emphasized the view of the corporate accountant that the 
brothers would be employed at the business for life. [d. at 803. 
104. [d. 
105. No. C7-91-1142, 1992 WI.. 3651, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 14,1992), petition 
for review denied, (Minn. Mar. 26, 1992). 
106. [d. at *1. 
107. [d. at *3-4. 
108. [d. at *2-3. 
109. [d. at *3. The court distinguished Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779-80 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984), in which the court found in favor of the minority shareholder 
under the common law, in part because the majority shareholder threatened the 
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D. Fraud and Illegality 
As noted above, section 302A.751 proscribes not only 
conduct that is unfairly prejudicial, but also "fraudulent" and 
"illegal" conduct. llO These two standards have received little 
attention from the courts.1ll 
Presumably, the reference to "fraud" incorporates common 
law principles of fraud. In general terms, the standard definition 
requires a false representation of a material past or present fact, 
the defendant's knowledge of the falsity (or assertion of the 
representation without knowing of its truth or falsity), the 
defendant's intention that the plaintiff act on the representation, 
action by the plaintiff in reliance on the representation, and 
damages suffered by the plaintiff as a proximate cause of the 
representation.112 
The term "illegality," which is not defined in the statute,ll3 
has a less obvious reference point. One definition of "illegal" is 
"against or not authorized by law."114 Certainly "illegal" in 
section 302A. 751 would refer to actions rendered illegal by 
corporate statutes, such as holding a shareholder's meeting 
without notice. ll5 In the context of shareholder-employees 
who are discharged, this language also could be read to incorpo-
rate public law restrictions on termination of employment, as 
described in section D of Part II. 
This reading could be significant, because standing require-
ments of employment statutes may deny a shareholder-employee 
minority shareholder, acted behind his back, and engaged in intimidating behavior. 
KeUey, 1992 WL 3651, at *3. 
110. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81. 
111. In KeUey v. Rudd, Mr. Kelley alleged that he had been fraudulently induced into 
signing the employment contracts, as an aspect of his § 302A. 751 claim. But the court 
ruled that the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations in Minnesota 
Statutes § 541.05, subd. 1 (6) (1990). KeUey, 1992 WL 3651, at *3. Mr. Pedro claimed 
slander and infliction of emotional distress, but those claims were dismissed during the 
first trial. Pedro l, 463 N.W.2d at 287. 
112. E.g., Rognlien v. Carter, 443 N.W.2d 217, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). In 
employment cases, the representation often pertains to present intention as to a future 
event; it may be actionable if the promisor had no intention to perform at the time. See 
id. at 220-21. 
113. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.011 (1994). 
114. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990). 
115. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.435 (1994). 
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a claim under those statutes. ll6 For example, discrimination 
statutes speak of claims brought by an "employee" against an 
"employer."Il7 Case law under federal discrimination statutes 
suggests, although not unequivocally, that shareholders in closely 
held corporations may have difficulty fitting within such 
language. 
If shareholders are analogized to partners,118 the case law 
stands against the shareholder's claim. The origin of the 
principle that partners may not pursue claims under discrimina-
tion statutes is Justice Powell's concurrence in Hishon v. King & 
SPalding, which holds that the decision to admit an associate in 
a law firm to partnership is not covered by Title VII. Il9 Justice 
Powell wrote: 
[T]he Court's opinion should not be read as extending Title 
VII to the management of a law firm by its partners. The 
reasoning of the Court's opinion does not require that the 
relationship among partners be characterized as an "employ-
ment" relationship to which Title VII would apply. The 
relationship among law partners differs markedly from that 
between employer and employee-including that between the 
partnership and its associates. The judgmental and sensitive 
decisions that must be made among the partners embrace a 
wide range of subjects. The essence of the law of partnership 
is the common conduct of a shared enterprise. The relation-
ship among law partners contemplates that decisions impor-
tant to the partnership normally will be made by common 
agreement ... or consent among the partners. 120 
Thus, for example, in Wheeler v. Hurdman, the Tenth Circuit 
held that a partner in an accounting firm who alleged that she 
was expelled based on her gender and age could not pursue a 
116. For a discussion of this topic in the context of professional corporations, see 
John Narducci, The Application of Antidiscrimination Statutes to Shareholders of Professional 
Corporations: Forcing Fellow Shareholders Out of the Club, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 839 (1987). 
117. For example, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee because of the employee's age of 40 or more. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(a)(1994). The ADEA defines an "employee" as "an individual employed by any 
employer .... " Id. § 630(f); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(f) (1994) (ADA); MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 16 (1994) (MHRA). 
118. Recall that the Pedro case proceeds from this assumption. Pedro II, 489 N.W.2d 
at 801. 
119. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
120. Id. at 79-80 (Powell,]., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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claim under federal discrimination statutes. l21 Following an 
extensive analysis of the tests used to define "employee" in 
various legal and factual settings,122 the court concluded that 
the "total bundle of partnership characteristics," in particular 
those of Ms. Wheeler, makes a partner not an "employee."123 
The court stressed the following characteristics: participation in 
profit and loss, exposure to liability, investment in the firm, 
partial ownership of firm assets, voting rights, and status under 
partnership law and the partnership agreement.124 The court 
distinguished "a small, voting shareholder/director or officer of 
a large corporation. "125 
The case law on closely held corporations is somewhat 
murky. In Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., the Eleventh Circuit 
decided that a member-shareholder of a small accounting firm 
was a "partner," not an "employee," and hence could not bring 
a claim under the ADEA.126 The court noted that the plaintiff, 
unlike true employees of the firm, was compensated on the basis 
of the firm's profits, was liable for certain of its obligations, 
owned thirty-one percent of the firm, and could vote on various 
decisions-including admission and termination of other 
member-shareholders.127 
The Eleventh Circuit declined to follow128 the Second 
Circuit's decision in Hyland v. New Haven Rndiology Associates.129 
In Hyland, the Second Circuit permitted Dr. Hyland to pursue 
his ADEA claim against the professional corporation in which he 
was a shareholder, director, officer, and employee.130 The 
court reasoned that the corporation had selected the corporate 
entity and could not now deny it in order to depict Dr. Hyland 
121. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 277 (lOth Cir.), ecrt. denied, 484 U.S. 986 
(1987). The firm had over 500 "parmers" at the time. [d. at 260. 
122. [d. at 262-75. 
123. [d. at 276. 
124. [d. 
125. [d.; see also Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869-70 (7th Cir. 1977) (parmers 
may not be counted as employees for determining the fifteen-employee threshold under 
Title VII). 
126. Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., 925 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991). 
127. [d. at 1399; see also E.E.O.C. v. Dowd & Dowd, 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 
1984) (en bane) (shareholders, analogous to parmers, can not be counted in 
determining whether an entity meets the 15-employee threshold). 
128. Fountain, 925 F.2d at 1400. 
129. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986). 
130. [d. at 798. 
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as a partner for ADEA purposes.l!ll Furthermore, the court 
wrote: 
The status of Dr. Hyland is clear-not only was he an 
officer, director and shareholder of NHRA, he also was 
specifically designated as an employee of the corporation in 
an employment agreement containing detailed provisions 
relating to the terms and conditions of his employment. 
There was nothing inconsistent between his proprietary 
interest ... and the corporate employment relationship he 
held. An analysis of his status need proceed no further. 132 
The dissent argued that the majority had honored form over 
substance.133 
E. Remedies 
The remedies under section 302A.751 are defined as "any 
equitable relief [the court] deems just and reasonable in the 
circumstances. "134 Furthermore, the statute explicitly lists 
dissolution and buy-out as options,135 as well as provides for 
attorney fees and expenses where the defendant has acted 
"arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith. "136 The 
legislative history clearly suggests that the courts' range of 
options is wide and their discretion is substantial. IS7 
In Sawyer, the shareholder sought and won a buy-out and 
attorney fees. lss Furthermore, the court ruled that she could 
obtain the buy-out from the other shareholders if the corpora-
tion itself was unable to carry it out.139 
In Pedro, by contrast, Alfred Pedro sought-and 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 799 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Similarly, in a case predating Hishon, 
the Seventh Circuit treated as an employee a vice-president who held one-third of a 
closely held corporation's stock; however the firm's total employee count fell below the 
ADEA threshold. Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1983). 
134. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (1994). 
135. [d. subds. I, 2. 
136. Id. subd. 4. 
137. SeeJoseph E. Olson, Statutrny Chan~ Improve Position of Mi'TlO1ity Shareholders in 
Closely-Held Corpurations, 53 HENNEPIN LAw. 10, 11 (Sept.-Oct. 1983); see also Thompson, 
supra note 69, at 718-26 (discussing remedies under various states' statutes). 
138. Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *3 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) (publication order vacated, 1991 WL 160333, Minn. 
Aug. 2, 1991). 
139. [d. at *2. 
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obtained-not just a buy-out according to the stock repurchase 
agreement, but also the difference between that price and the 
fair market value of his shares, a wage-based recovery for ten 
years after the tennination, prejudgment interest, and attorney 
fees. l40 The court rejected the defendants' argument that the 
stock price recovery and the wage recovery constituted double 
recovery, noting that there were two distinct losses-employment 
and ownership-to compensate.141 In dictum, the court 
suggested that the award properly would run against the Pedro 
brothers and the corporation jointly and severally. 142 
In the cases decided under section 302A.751, the courts 
have not examined the appropriateness of the equitable remedy 
used in employment termination cases: reinstatement. 143 Nor 
do the cases under section 302A.751 afford recovery of punitive 
damages.l44 
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND SYNTHESIS 
A. Preliminary Obseroations 
Consider again Ms. Allison's dispute with her fellow 
shareholders and the firm they founded, presented in Part I. 
What legal rights should she have as a consequence of her 
employment?l45 What remedy should the law afford her as 
compensation for her tennination? 
A natural starting point is to argue that she should have the 
same rights as any other employee; that is, she would be entitled 
to pursue a claim for wrongful tennination under the common 
law and statutes described in Part II. She would argue for a 
contract exception to the at-will rule,l46 and she also would 
140. Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), petition for 
review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). 
141. Id. at 803. 
142. Id. 
143. There is a mention of such a remedy in a common law case, but the trial court 
abandoned it, obviating appellate discussion. See Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 777 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
144. Cf Evans, 345 N.W.2d at 781 (under the common law, awarding the 
shareholder punitive damages against the oppressing shareholder personally). 
Presumably punitive damages also would be available under § 302A. 751 given an egre-
gious set of facts. 
145. This discussion does not address the details of her rights and remedies as a 
shareholder per se. 
146. See discussion supra Parts II.C and D. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1459 1996
1996] FIRED EMPLOYEES AND/OR FROZEN-OUT SHAREHOLDERS 1459 
assert that her termination was tainted by age-based animus and 
thus was ~rohibited under federal and state age discrimination 
statutes. 14 Depending on the basis for recovery, the remedies 
would include wage-based damages, compensatory damages, 
damages for mental anguish, liquidated damages, punitive 
damages, attorney fees, and reinstatement. l48 This approach 
focuses on Ms. Allison's holding a single "stick"-that of 
employee. 
But Ms. Allison holds other "sticks" as well. Because Ms. 
Allison, as a shareholder and founder, has invested in her 
employer in an unusual manner, one could argue that she is 
entitled to greater protection than a mere employee. This 
approach finds indirect support in the Bussard case, recognizing 
the role of additional consideration provided by the employee in 
establishing an exception to the at-will rule.149 On the other 
hand, because she has some power to control the firm's actions, 
one could argue that she is entitled to less protection than a 
regular employee. This approach finds indirect support in the 
federal discrimination cases denying protection to 
"partners." 150 
In my view, the employment interest of Ms. Allison and 
similarly situated shareholders is distinct and significant so as to 
merit specific protection. Minnesota law is in accord with this 
basic premise. The MBCA explicitly refers to the employment 
interest within a closely held corporation, 151 and the court of 
appeals has recognized this interest as distinct and signifi-
cant. 152 At the same time, this interest must be understood in 
context; Ms. Allison is not a regular employee. 
B. One Proposal 
In my view, the shareholder-employee's rights should be 
adjudicated in a proceeding under section 302A.751. Insofar as 
the employment interest is concerned, the courts should inquire 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 37,39. Her claim under federal law would 
depend on the finn's meeting the 2O-employee threshold of the ADEA. See 29 U.s.c. 
§ 630(b) (1994). 
148. See supra text accompanying notes 61Hi7. 
149. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
150. See supra text accompanying notes 118-33. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88, 93-104. 
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into several matters: 
(1) Does the termination violate public law? 
(2A) If the shareholders have made an agreement about the 
permissible grounds for termination of employment, does the 
termination meet the requirements of that agreement? 
(2B) If the shareholders have not made such an agreement, 
does the termination rest on legitimate business purposes of 
the corporation? 
With one exception, the remedies available should be modeled 
on the remedies afforded an employee with a comparable claim. 
1. Adjudication within Section 302A. 751 's Framework 
Protection of the shareholder's employment interest should 
be secured within a section 302A.751 action. Section 302A.751 
is a flexible mechanism, flexible enough to accommodate 
employment issues as well as more traditional corporate is-
sues.153 Furthermore, the loss of employment may well coin-
cide with the loss of shareholder rights. 154 Joining the employ-
ment issues with the accompanying corporate issues permits 
coordination in such matters as proof, factfinding, and remedies, 
whereas separating them unnecessarily complicates the proceed-
ings. 155 
153. See Olson, supra note 137, at 11. 
154. Indeed in the Sawyer case, the court saw the loss of employment, in and of 
itself, as a violation of the shareholder's rights. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88. 
155. There are procedural differences between the employment and corporate 
causes of action. For example, a contract case ordinarily would be tried to a jury, 
whereas cases under the MHRA and MBCA could be tried to advisory juries. See Bilal 
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1995) (MHRA claim tried to advisory 
jury); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983) (handbook case); 
Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) petition for rev. denied (Minn. 
Jan. 24, 1991), on appeal after reward, 489 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), petition 
f()T review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992) (MBCA case tried to advisory jury). The statutes 
of limitations also vary between employment and corporate causes of action. See MINN. 
STAT. §§ 302A.557, subd. 2; 302A559, subd. 4; 302A.729, subd. 2 (1994) (two-year 
statute of limitations for various actions under MBCA); Portlance v. Golden Valley State 
Bank, 405 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Minn. 1987) (also two-year statute for contract claim); 
MINN. STAT. § 363.06, subd. 3 (1994) (one-year statute of limitations for claims under 
the MHRA). 
It is less sensible to use the employment law mechanisms precisely because multiple 
mechanisms exist. Furthermore, an employment law proceeding would not encompass 
the non-employment dimensions of the shareholder's claim. 
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behavior.157 
The rationale for this first inquiry is straightforward: If the 
public interest is harmed by termination of an employee for a 
given reason, such as whistleblowing or discriminatory motives, 
it is harmed whether the employee is a regular employee or a 
shareholder-employee. For example, had Alfred Pedro suspected 
that his brothers were engaged in illegal kickbacks and pursued 
his concerns with public authorities,158 public policy would call 
for protecting him from termination just as if the company's 
accountant had pursued the same suspicion. Indeed the 
shareholder-employee arguably should receive heightened 
protection as her vantage point within the company may permit 
more accurate assessment of corporate wrongdoing. Similarly, 
if Mr. Pedro's age prompted his discharge, public policy 
embodied in age discrimination statutes would call for a remedy. 
To a certain extent, this recommendation appears to 
counter the federal cases denying "partners" standing under 
discrimination statutes. Of course, unlike those statutes, section 
302A. 751 expressly grants shareholder-employees standing. 159 
Furthermore, those cases miss some important points. First, 
when a shareholder-employee loses her position for discriminato-
ry reasons, she scarcely has any real power within the corpora-
tion on issues of internal management; she is not a "partner" in 
any significant sense. Second, the public interest in forestalling 
discrimination does not end at access to the ranks of partner or 
shareholder; 160 discrimination at high echelons of American 
business is equally troublesome.161 
3. The Agreement or the Legitimate Business Purpose 
Rule 
The second inquiry is less concerned with public law 
157. MINN. STAT. § 302A. 751, subd. 1 (b)(2) (1994). 
158. If Mr. Pedro were an employee and had acted in good faith by reporting the 
suspected violation of the law to government officials, this activity would be protected 
under MINN. STAT. §181.932, subd. 1 (a) (1994). 
159. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. l(b) (1994). 
160. Justice Powell, concurring in Hishon, apparently took the opposite view. See 
supra text accompanying notes 119-20. 
161. See generally MINNESOTA GLASS CEILING TASK FORCE, THE GLASS CEIUNG TASK 
FORCE REpORT (1995); HENNEPIN COUNlY BAR AsS'N, HENNEPIN COUNlY BAR AsS'N 
GLASS CEIUNG TASK FORCE REPORT, "WALKING THROUGH INVISIBLE DOORS SHATTERING 
GLASS CEIUNGS" (1993). 
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The second inquiry is less concerned with public law 
restrictions on termination than with honoring the private 
arrangement among the shareholders as to job security. This 
inquiry is grounded in several provisions of section 302A.751: 
the prohibition of "unfairly prejudicial" conduct;162 the require-
ment of "honest, fair, and reasonable" action;163 and the 
references to "reasonable expectations" and "written agree-
ments."I64 These three provisions can be synthesized into a 
two-branched analysis. 
First, if the corporation and shareholders carry out any 
agreements among them as to termination of employment, they 
have acted in a manner that is not "unfairly prejudicial" and that 
is "honest, fair, and reasonable." This is so regardless of what 
the agreement is. I65 If the agreement provides for job security, 
its fairness is not difficult to see. Even if the agreement calls for 
no job security, it may be deemed fair l66 because it was bar-
gained for by the shareholder. Hence, the lack of job security 
should come as no surprise and presumably is offset by favorable 
terms as to other matters. 167 
Thus, the first branch is to discern whether there was an 
agreement among the parties and whether its terms were 
followed. Analysis of whether the terms of an agreement have 
been followed will vary from case to case, of course. In discern-
ing whether there was an agreement among the parties, the 
courts are likely to encounter two dilemmas, both answerable by 
standard principles of contract law. 
GLASS CEILING TASKFORCE REpORT, "WALKING THROUGH INVISIBLE DOORS SHATTERING 
GLASS CEILINGS" (1993). . 
162. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. l(b)(3) (1994). 
163. [d. subd. 3a. 
164. [d. 
165. If, however, the agreement provided no protection and were a part of the 
squeeze-out, it should not be given effect. 
166. In some sense, this contradicts the Sawyer case, which seems to say that 
termination of employment in and of itself is "unfairly prejudicial" conduct, so that a 
buy-out is appropriate. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88. The Sawyer case does 
not, however, address other remedies. 
167. The at-will arrangement is fairer in the context of shareholder-employees than 
in traditional employment settings, because there likely is awareness of it and some 
capacity on the part of the shareholder to bargain for it. 
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First, what constitutes the agreement? Both orall68 and 
written agreements should be recognized, with a preference for 
a writing. Section 302A.751 presumes that any written agree-
ment represents the understanding of the parties.169 Similarly, 
the parol evidence rule provides that a written integrated 
agreement governs over prior written or oral and contemporane-
ous oral agreements of the parties.170 Extrinsic evidence (such 
as parol evidence, evidence of common usage and practice 
between the parties, indications of the circumstances at the time 
of contracting) may be useful in interpreting a written agree-
ment. l71 
Second, how should the courts handle modifications of the 
agreement? Section 302A.751 recognizes that the agreement 
may evolve over time.172 Contract law also permits modifica-
tion with the mutual consent of the parties, appropriate 
consideration, or circumstances rendering the modification 
equitable.173 Thus, in Kelly v. Rudd, the court of appeals was 
partly right.174 The court properly looked to the parties' 
written agreement; it also properly recognized that the parties' 
agreement may change over time (although it would have been 
preferable to explain how the modification came to be). 
In some situations, however, there will be no agreement 
between the parties; then the second branch is to be pursued. 
At this point, the law must provide a default rule. 175 The rule 
should not be employment-at-will; that rule does not reflect the 
168. An additional limitation is the statute of frauds, which bars enforcement of an 
oral contract not performable within one year. See Roaderick v. Lull Eng'g Co., 208 
N.W.2d 761, 763-64 (Minn. 1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 130 (1981) 
(statute of frauds). 
169. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (1994). 
170. See Norwest Bank Minn., NA v. Midwestern Mach., 481 N.W.2d 875, 881 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (banking case), petition for review denied, (Minn. May 15, 1992); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS §§ 213, 214 (1981). 
171. See generaUy Eklund v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co., 351 N.W.2d 371, 376 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989), petition for reuiew denied, (Minn. Nov. 1, 1989); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 202 (1981). 
172. MINN. STAT. § 302A. 751, subd. 3a (1994). 
173. See Freemen v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 89 (1987). 
174. See sufrra text accompanying 105-09. 
175. This default rule operates only where employment is pan of the shareholder's 
participation; the rule does not create an entitlement to employment for an investor-
shareholder. 
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contributions of the shareholder beyond employment itself.176 
Nor should the rule require just cause or good faith reasons for 
termination, given the delicacy of high-level employment 
decisions. 177 Rather there must be legitimate business purpos-
es for the termination of the shareholder's employment. 
This requirement captures the sense of section 302A.751. 
It recognizes that termination of employment will be prejudicial 
to the shareholder, while acknowledging that prejudice is not 
unfair if the corporation has a legitimate business purpose for it. 
When the corporation acts for legitimate business purposes, it 
acts fairly, honestly, and reasonably. This standard is used to 
assess other corporate decisions, such as expenditure of corpo-
rate funds. 178 
The operation of this rule is illustrated in the leading 
Massachusetts case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home. 179 In that 
case, a minority shareholder was squeezed out because he 
pressed for and secured a higher price for corporate assets sold 
to a fellow shareholder than the shareholder desired to pay. He 
was terminated from employment although he had performed 
competently and stood ready to do SO.180 Relying on general 
concepts of fiduciary duty, a sense of the centrality of the 
employment interest, and an awareness of the corporation's 
interest in managerial discretion,181 the court developed the 
following rule: 
It must be asked whether the controlling group can demon-
strate a legitimate business purpose for its action .... When 
an asserted business purpose for their action is advanced by 
the majority, ... we think it is open to minority stockholders 
to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have 
been achieved through an alternative course of action less 
harmful to the minority'S interest .... If called on to settle a 
dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate business 
purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less harmful 
alternative. 182 
176. See supra Parts ll.B.-D. 
177. See Pugh v. See's Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927-28 (1981). 
178. See Dullea v. Dullea Co., No. C8-91-498, 1991 WL 271479, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Dec. 24, 1991), petitionfrn review denied, (Minn. Feb. 19, 1992). 
179. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
180. Id. at 660-61. 
181. Id. at 661-63. 
182. Id. 
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This framework has analogues in various areas of employment 
law.18S 
Incidentally, the two branches-following the parties' 
agreement and requiring legitimate business purposes-are not 
unrelated. The latter serves as the presumed "agreement" of the 
parties where they have failed to reach their own agreement; it 
is sensible to presume that a shareholder would not be terminat-
ed without legitimate business purposes. Furthermore, where 
the parties' agreement lapses or is too indeterminate to ascertain 
with adequate certainty, the legitimate business purpose standard 
would apply. 
Hence the Kelley casel84 should have been analyzed differ-
endy in part. Once the court determined that the written agree-
ments had lapsed, the governing principle would be the 
legitimate business purpose standard, rather than the at-will rule. 
The two-branched analysis set forth above thus defines the 
parties' "reasonable expectations" under section 302A.751. If 
they have entered into an agreement, they reasonably should 
expect to follow it. If not, they reasonably should expect that 
employment will continue absent legitimate business purposes 
for termination. 185 
4. Remedies 
As with employment law remedies available to regular 
employees, the remedies available to terminated sharehold-
ersl86 should vary according to the nature of the wrong suf-
fered. Thus, if the claim is based on the parties' agreement or 
on the default rule requiring a legitimate business purpose, the 
remedy will be based on the shareholder's economic losses 
183. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAw § 3.25 (1994) (discussing less 
discriminatory alternatives in the context of discrimination law). 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09. 
185. There is a difference in degree between "expectation" and "agreement" here. 
The legitimate business purpose standard is posited as a working assumption or default 
rule. If the parties wish to override it, they must take affirmative steps to craft an agree-
ment-one way (at-will) or another (greater job security). 
186. The Sawyer case suggests the shareholders may be personally liable for a 
§ 302A. 751 remedy when the corporation lacks the resources to pay. Sawyer v. Curt & 
Co., Nos. C7·90-2040, C9-90-2041, 1991 WL 65320, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991) 
(publication order vacated, 1991 WL 160333, Minn. Aug. 2, 1991). The Pedro case 
indicates that a § 302A. 751 recovery can run against the corporation and the 
shareholders jointly and severally. Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 803 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992), petition for review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992). 
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identifiable with termination of employment, namely lost wages 
and benefits.187 If the claim is based on public law, such as 
tort or statute, the wider range of remedies available to a regular 
employee also ought to be available to a shareholder-employ-
ee.188 The recovery is, of course, subject to a requirement that 
the employee mitigate her damages.189 
It may seem that this result leads to double recovery if the 
shareholder also obtains a buy-out. The court of appeals in the 
Pedro case thought notl90-and properly so. The employment 
recovery compensates the shareholder for loss of a "stick" 
separate from the ownership interests. A shareholder who is not 
an employee may be fully compensated for the loss of her 
investment and future earnings through a buy-out. But a 
shareholder who also is an employee suffers additional losses. 
She "loses" skills that are useful only at her prior employer, 
because they are tailored to its operations. She loses the 
advantages of tenure with the firm. She suffers psychological 
dislocation as well. If she is highly employable and these losses 
are not great, neither will her damages be great; but if the losses 
are substantial, her damages should be so as well. Finally, when 
the employment recovery is for a public law violation, the 
employment recovery addresses not just the shareholder's 
interest in compensation, but also the public's interest in 
deterring wrongful conduct by employers. 
While symmetry between the remedies available to regular 
employees and shareholder-ernployees is generally desirable, one 
remedy should not be available to the latter: reinstatement. 
Whether it is wise to return a regular employee to work after the 
employer has terminated her is debatable. 191 It no doubt is 
futile to expect a closely held corporation to operate smoothly 
when a shareholder has been frozen out, litigation has ensued, 
and the court has compelled the shareholder's return. While 
closely held corporations generally should be accountable as 
other employers are, at the shareholder level, they should 
remain voluntary associations for mutual gain. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. 
189. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
190. See supra text accompanying notes 1~2. 
191. See generally MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN 
ARBITRATION 145-46 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing reinstatement orders generally). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
If the proposal just stated were the law, Ms. Allison could 
pursue not only a buy-out remedy under section 302A.751, but 
also recovery for loss of employment. This claim would have two 
chief dimensions and several interesting issues of fact to sort 
out.192 
First, Ms. Allison could claim that her employment was 
terminated illegally for age-based reasons. Second, she could 
rely on the agreement requiring "performance deficiencies" 
before termination and seek to demonstrate that those grounds 
did not exist. This agreement would supplant the default rule 
requiring legitimate business purposes. If Ms. Allison's claim 
were to succeed, the range of remedies would be those stated at 
the outset of Part IV-less reinstatement. 
Both dimensions of the claim point to the same factual 
issue: what were the grounds for the termination. Several facts 
work in her favor: the age-related comments during the key 
meeting, the stereotypical assumptions underlying the assessment 
of her reduced productivity, the weakness of the factual record 
as to client concerns over her performance, and the failure of 
her fellow shareholders to investigate her performance further. 
In sum, "[w]ithin a closely held enterprise, a[n] ... intimate 
and intense relationship exists between capital and labor."193 
Under Minnesota's "innovative" statute,194 when a shareholder 
suffers a loss of her capacity to contribute her labor to the 
enterprise, this interest should not be obscured by the capital 
interest, but rather protected by the rules of employment law 
and valued for its own sake. 
192. InE.E.O.C. v.Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996), the Second 
Circuit ruled that director-owners of a private corporation with thirty-five directors were 
employees protected by the ADEA. The organization had chosen the corporate forum 
(not partnership). Although the directors had duties and were compensated as 
directors, they also continued to serve as senior managers, reported to the senior board, 
and were evaluated by the senior board. The ADEA thus covers the requirement that 
they retire in their 60's as firm managers. Id. at 1537-40. 
193. Thompson, supra note 70, at 702. 
194. Id. at 740. 
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